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

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NEWS AND VIEWS

The Church Peace Mission, which has been meeting quietly the past three years to talk through and across traditional pacifist-nonpacifist polarities into deeper perspectives on war and peace, reconstituted itself at a recent gathering at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary as the Society for Politics and Theological Ethics.

It was a happy decision, for before the group convened the last weekend of April there was a disposition among some members to dissolve. What was there to justify existence? Impact was discouraging (the group was still searching for a sponsor); there were no publications to show for their meetings. The sole redeeming detail was that a couple of times a year the group brought together men of common Christian concern to probe issues in search of decision-making frameworks.

But this, in itself, was sufficient to demand the continuation of the group in some form. For if the group as a group was not publishing and confronting, its members as individuals were—and benefited greatly from the inter-Church theological exchange made possible by their meetings.

The names of these men are not unfamiliar to those who follow the efforts of that handful seeking to work out concrete Christian perspectives for specific peace and war tensions. The Pittsburgh gathering included Fr. John McKenzie, S.J., James Douglass, Paul Peachey, John Yoder, Donald Miller, John Oliver Nelson, Deitrich Ritschl, Lionel Whiston and Ralph Potter.

On questions of peace and war the positions of these men range the spectrum of Christian social ethics, from the just war to unqualified pacifism. It seemed urgent that they be kept together, if only for the self-orientation their meetings provided them as individuals in positions to influence peace perspectives.

The decision to continue carries with it broader goals than the now dissolved Church Peace Mission. The new Society for Politics and Theological Ethics will reach beyond its membership of writers, lecturers, professors, and seek furtherance of contacts and discussions between theologians and politicians generally. Toward that end, the society plans colloquiums twice annually. The objective will be the quickening of consciences on peace issues. The first colloquium is scheduled for New York next December; topic will be "Theology and Political Change."

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The dissatisfaction at *Ramparts* that ended in the ouster of Edward M. Keating as president and publisher was less a surprise than might at first have been thought. *Ramparts* editors told of wild Keating schemes, such as uncovering alleged slave camps in Louisiana and exposing a Knights of Columbus "plot" to take over the country. Such notions are not inconsistent with thought processes revealed by Keating in his book, *The Scandal of Silence*. . . . On the other hand, a *Ramparts* staffer recently told a *Commonweal* editor, "We just keep Keating around to give us respectability" —a remark that raises questions of integrity and sincerity quite separate from the talent and performance of Keating.

•

Extension magazine, in an editorial in its May issue, notes that the German Bishops' Conference plans a national Catholic magazine, and wonders whether, "in the spirit of collegiality" (whatever that has to do with the question), it is not time "to launch one great national Catholic magazine" in the United States.

"Technically superb, professionally edited, sponsored by our American Bishops, such a magazine could attract truly national circulation and advertising," *Extension* argues. "There would be one strong, clear Catholic voice on every newsstand in America."

Extension adds coyly and, we trust, not suggestive of itself: "There might even be a Catholic magazine ready and willing to volunteer."

•

We have always had a sneaking regard for Cassius Clay. It is the more definite since, at great personal and financial sacrifice, he took his stand in conscience with regard to the draft.

We have always had a near-contempt for boxing. It is total since boxing's lords stripped Clay of his title and set about plans for an eight-man, seven-match tourney to determine a new champion.

We thought at first that the ditching of Clay was attributable to some misguided patriotism; more sober reflection convinces us that the decision involves nothing but money.

•

We hope we are not being cynical, but the reference to the Justice Department of the actions of the persons who triggered the look into the Dodd mess for possible violations of law has for us overtones of warning to others similarly able to cause difficulties.

The Senate Ethics Committee perhaps had no alternative except to do as it did. But it is also serving notice, it seems, that it considers the decorum of the "club" to have been sufficiently upset for the time being—if not indefinitely.

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Eastman Kodak Corporation, through the lens of Saul Alinsky: "When we talk about negotiations (on rights issues), Kodak thinks about unions. And when they think about unions, they check the airport to see when the last flight came in from Peking."

•

Final thought: Harrison Salisbury should have received the Pulitzer Prize for his reporting from North Vietnam . . . and the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, for reasons of propriety, might have seen that the story on the "overruling" of Salisbury broke elsewhere than in the paper of Joseph Pulitzer Jr.

JOHN DEEDY

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CORRESPONDENCE

The A.M.A.

Torrington, Conn.

To the Editors: By now as a physician I should have a thick skin so far as polemics about the American Medical Association, but "Crisis in Medicine" by Edward T. Chase (March 10) demeans the standards of *Commonweal*.

I won't attempt to rebut the generalizations and partial truths in his article, but I'll try to explain a little of "organized" medicine.

First, I'm sorry to wax autobiographical, but I must to allay any suspicions of blind allegiance to the A.M.A. I'm a specialist in general surgery, a Democrat, holding office on its ticket, and an American Civil Libertarian. In 1948 when the A.M.A. assessed all its members $25.00 for an educational (political) campaign, I resigned because I resented its being used mostly for Republicans. Maturity has taught me that the way to effect change in an organization is in it, not out of it. In 1958, during a little revolution we had in our state medical society, I was elected a delegate (1 of 3) to the A.M.A. But I couldn't accept; I wasn't a member of the A.M.A. I rejoined. Last year, I was again elected a delegate to the A.M.A. At no time was pressure ever put on me or did I suffer economically because I was not a member of the A.M.A.

About the "organization." Generally the A.M.A. is a voluntary association. It is a federation, made up of the 50 state societies with delegates elected to the governing House of Delegates on the basis of state membership population. The House of Delegates meets twice a year, and elects a 13-man Board of Trustees to transact business between meetings. I have made a study of the practices and constitutions of other professional and voluntary associations. I challenge Mr. Chase to suggest changes in the A.M.A. constitution making for greater democracy; and to name any association with greater democracy for its membership.

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THE DISSENT AHEAD

The "International War Crimes Tribunal" convened by British philosopher Bertrand Russell emitted a histrionic tone from the moment almost of its conception. The difficulty in finding a locus (the tribunal met in Stockholm after having been denied permission to sit in France and Switzerland), the lack of official mandate, the predispositions of its membership, the absence of legal standing and procedure, the inability to make any findings binding —these signaled in advance that the "trial" was to be more a forum, and a strongly anti-American one, than a serious exercise in even unofficial jurisprudence.

Nor did the public statements of tribunal officials assist in making the event more creditable. Emotionalism crept into the utterances of such ordinarily sober thinkers as Jean-Paul Sartre, tending to diffuse focus and diminish impact. Sartre, to confine ourselves to him, was hardly less boorish when he labeled Secretary of State Dean Rusk "a mediocre American functionary" than Rusk himself was when he spurned a tribunal overture with the remark that he did not wish "to play games with a 94-year-old Englishman." Their cutting remarks accent the mutual tendentiousness that help fate the business at hand to futility.

These things said, we still do not consider the "International War Crimes Tribunal" to have been a waste of time or energy. The tribunal served a purpose in dramatizing to the world, and, hopefully, to Americans, the intense conviction of a responsible and respected element of society that the United States is about a criminal course in Vietnam. Whatever its shortcomings and failures, the tribunal will prove worthwhile if it induces Americans generally to a reassessment of positions and responsibilities—the hawkish, that they might ponder anew the immoral, possibly fatal adventure that the United States is upon; the dovish, that they might become more aware of the challenges that are theirs as persuaders for peace.

For the latter, the "International War Crimes Tribunal" has the special message that it is time they expand beyond tactics borrowed bodily and

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sometimes unimaginatively from the civil rights movement—marches, protest meetings, teach-ins, and the like—and provide for new, bright and blunter confrontations of issues and personalities. The Russell tribunal was important in precisely this respect; it was a dramatic innovation in an area hitherto unexplored and even now unexploited (but which will be if plans materialize for further sessions of the tribunal).

And still it is only one direction in which possibilities for opposition to the war lie. Dr. Martin Luther King, in endorsing the purposes of Vietnam Summer 1967, the new grassroots project aimed at arousing the consciences of millions of citizens in communities across the nation, remarked that escalations of the war should be countered by escalations of opposition to the war. In so speaking, he touched the heart of the problem of dissent in terms of an escalation for peace capitalizing on impetuses generated by the impressive April 15 peace demonstrations, and supported also, we are happy to note, by Atlanta's Archbishop Paul J. Hallinan, Dr. John C. Bennett, Dr. Benjamin Spock, Rabbi Abraham Heschel and other leaders of the peace community.

Vietnam Summer seeks to enlist 10,000 volunteers, including 2,000 full-time workers, in an organizational and educational drive against the war. It is an ambitious project and, if it is proportionately as successful as the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer Project that it is patterned after, it could be a factor in the affairs of the nation. But it should not and cannot be the sole focus of dissent even for the short months of summer. Other pressures must also be brought to bear to rout the Johnson Administration's perverse determination to see Vietnam through, come hell, high water, Red China, Russia and nuclear warfare—and come they all may.

It is at this point that further initiatives are demanded—and promised. Some urge formation of a third political party; some speak of filibuster and legislative obstructionism in the Congress; many work toward intensified public demonstrations; there are even disconcerting whisperings of violence, particularly among elements of the country's youth. We detach ourselves unqualifiedly from all instincts toward violence, but we encourage these other and all legal moves and devices that might bring the Johnson Administration to its senses or to some formal accountability for its conduct in Vietnam.

The heightened anti-war pressures that are as certain as the summer's sun will pose problems for the larger element of society that prefers a witness that is congenial and genteel. These people are advised now to suppress qualms. The peace movement needs everybody it can marshal. If the company becomes unpleasant and the movement, as a result, gets a little messy, then we can only say that it is what a messy war makes inevitable—and perhaps deserves. The day is past when Americans could afford the luxury of selective protest. The involvement of all, the shorn and the unshorn, the washed and the unwashed, must be coordinated into a gigantic effort to rescue nation and world from what can only be described as Lyndon's folly.

In this context the months ahead become a testing period for the American citizenry. As we move into those months the nation will learn the precise extent of the commitment to peace of millions who have enjoyed a tranquillity that came from being unchallenged. Their response is crucial. We expect it not to be disappointing.

IDEOLOGICAL TRAP

The polls don't really tell us much about the way Americans feel about the war. Nonetheless, a few facts are clear. First, Americans dislike the war. Second, they dislike Communism even more. The strategic importance of Vietnam, even of all Southeast Asia, is of little concern to the average citizen. He may be concerned over the behavior of Red China, but he would be no more or less concerned if Vietnam, like North Korea, had been Communist since the end of World War II.

The point is, he says, that we are "stopping Communism." And if the U.S. doesn't "stop Communism" here it will have to do the stopping elsewhere.

Not that there is much evidence to support such a view of the world. It it were true, then there should be no war in Vietnam. For didn't the U.S. "stop Communism" in Greece and in a half-dozen other places around the globe, from Korea to the Dominican Republic?

But, of course, the original theory was not really that silly. During the '20s and '30s, Moscow largely transformed national Communist parties into mere extensions of its own policies. Once the Cold War began, "stopping Communism" and stopping Soviet expansion were naturally equated.

Today the equation does not hold. Nor does stopping Communism necessarily amount to stopping Chinese expansion. Communist parties can choose to be loyal to Peking, to Moscow, or to themselves alone. They may, in fact, choose to be actively hostile to either Peking or Moscow, in which case the Soviets or the Chinese might have as much reason to "stop Communism" as the U.S. Despite these facts, America is stuck with the old phrases; in short, we are trapped in an outdated ideology.

Specific examples are not difficult to find. The bishops' "Latin America Victory Fund," for instance, recently sent out an appeal for aid to Latin American slum dwellers. Indeed the appeal properly stresses the "unspeakable hell" of the Latin slums. But then it also warns that unless aid is forthcoming, "the Communist block [sic] will soon add 20 decisive new nations to its side." What Communist "block"? China's? Russia's? Or possibly—since the appeal warns of "Castroism"—Cuba's? The authors of the appeal certainly meant no harm; they probably never thought about what they were writing. Which is exactly

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the point. The Cold War rhetoric has seeped so deeply into our minds that we spout it automatically.

And this creates problems. The globe is not divided into the free world and the Comunist world, with a gain for one being necessarily a loss for the other. Much of the globe remains neither free nor Communist but simply hungry and suffering. It is still mired in old ways and has yet to face the task of modernization. If all of these nations were to proceed with modernization in accordance with ideals of the Pope's recent encyclical, that would be fine, though economists might not agree that it is universally possible. But that is unlikely. Some states may choose an authoritarian method, in which the old classes take charge of the industrialization process as they did in Germany and Japan, a method easily leading to fascism. Again, some states may follow the Communist model, which, after all, has significant accomplishments to its credit in Russia and China. For the U.S. to decide that not one of the multitude of nations yet to modernize can be allowed to adopt the Communist method would be as arrogant as if the Soviet Union employed its power to permit not a single one of these nations to follow the route of liberal capitalism.

That is why the rhetoric of Cold War anti-Communism is dangerous. Extended to the developing world, it constructs an imaginary framework for U.S. policy. It condemns this nation to preserving misery in the name of freedom, involves it in conflicts which are not its business, and distracts it from the genuine challenges at home and abroad.

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Walter Reuther Tries to Build a Fire

Walter Reuther's proposal for an annual $14.5 million AFL-CIO organizing fund to enroll the poor, the agricultural laborers, and the unorganized generally will doubtless fall on deaf ears in the house on 16th Street which detractors call "The Mausoleum." But it is a partial corrective to what even friends of Reuther consider the maladroit execution of his schism with George Meany.

The dissension, simmering beneath the surface for ten years, burst the heavens like a bolt of lightning before the public had the vaguest idea what it was all about. Worse still, though the issues were still undefined, the UAW leader was already taking the organizational consequences—resigning from the AFL-CIO executive council, withdrawing UAW locals from city and state central bodies, and polling auto workers to authorize disaffiliation from the AFL-CIO.

Now the dramatic organizing plan gives the world an inkling of the divergent paths the two labor leaders are trodding. Reuther speaks bitterly of "repeated attempts" to get Meany to unionize agricultural workers and of the lukewarm response to initial efforts by Cesar Chavez in California. "It required continual prodding," says the auto worker chieftain, "merely to keep a microscopic effort going."

As Reuther sees it, this is a symptom of the malignancy in the AFL-CIO body. The fact is that the American labor movement, ensconced in marble palaces and manipulating weighty treasuries, is in deep and abiding trouble.

As of December 1955 when the AFL and CIO merged into a hyphenated new entity it represented 22.5 percent of the nation's laboring class. Jack Livingston, vice-president of the United Auto Workers, quit a job of substance and prestige to take over the duties of organizational director for the AFL-CIO in the mistaken notion he would soon become labor's number two man. With millions joining the union colors the man who organized them was bound to be a redoubtable figure.

As far as the eye can see *on the present basis* the horizon is bleak. From 1950 to 1960 the weight of white collar workers in the labor force grew from 37 to 45 percent, while that of blue collars declined from 41 to 36 percent. What is dire in these statistics is that organized labor is strongest in the contingent that is declining and pitifully weak amongst office employees, who as yet show little disposition to join.

By 1975 there will be an additional 13.5 million wage earners—the same number that are now in the AFL-CIO —but beyond a few Sunday prayers there is no plan other than Reuther's by which they can be armed with a union card.

Further, the crisis is compounded by the fact that one-half our population is today under 26 years of age. It feels little sense of identity with a movement whose great crusades are a generation gone, and whose leaders are tired old men.

Reuther's organizing plan is meant to hurdle these obstacles. It throws a few new ideas into the hopper, aimed at bringing out latent idealism in America and cementing a relationship with liberals and the New Left.

Foremost in this plan is the "community union." Five million dollars a year is to be spent on an agricultural drive and on "providing the poor with their own self-sufficient economic organization in their community." Hitherto the union structure has been work-place or job oriented. Workers were enrolled into unions of their industry or of their craft. The community union, by contrast, will bring together men and women on a *geographic* basis, where they live. It will concentrate on "social and economic need," on "health care, schools, public transportation, building maintenance, etc." Pilot projects of this sort in Delano, Watts and Chicago so far have enjoyed mixed success, but the idea has both promise and vision.

If labor were to mount such a campaign on a mammoth scale it could erase the stigma attached to it as an institutionalized goliath with a big pocketbook and a hardened

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heart. A drive which will bring in a negligible amount of dues, and from which no profit will ever be made ranks with mother love as a symbol of selflessness, and is bound to raise the union image quite a few notches. It will also stir the youth to move from their college libraries toward the grimy world of slums as never before. And if it succeeds, it will make the other part of Reuther's plan—a $9.5 million annual expenditure on organizing in traditional fields such as retail, services, government, white collar, and the South—far more possible of success.

"If," of course, is the determining word. As of now the labor factotums, with giant treasuries at their command and personal salaries in the upper five figure brackets, are less interested in assessing the future than riding the past. Contributing another 7 cents per member per month to dramatic new campaigns is not their cup of tea. Like the myopic leaders of the AFL in the 1930's, who found it difficult to reconcile themselves with such radical measures as relief and unemployment compensation, the present crop is content with seeing poverty erased at a snail's pace, if at all. Its vistas of solidarity end with its own unions, rather than labor as a whole.

Reuther, therefore, will begin on a small scale, with the more modest resources of the UAW and the Industrial Union Department, which he controls, hoping to pick up allies as he goes along. Those will probably include I.W. Abel of the million-member steel union, the leaders in oil, packinghouse, rubber and a few others.

The rest of the labor leadership will lay back in the woods until—and if—the plan succeeds. SIDNEY LENS

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NATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE POLITICS OF WAR

It increasingly looks as if the next presidential election will be decided on the battlefields of Vietnam. If in eighteen months, the war is about the same as it is now, the Johnson-Humphrey ticket will lose.

This outcome would not be precisely a repudiation of the Johnson Administration's policy in Vietnam. Rather, it would be an indication of the frustration and impatience of the American people. Theorists can contemplate a long war of attrition, but democratic electorates are impatient with hard, grinding, low-level wars in which the casualties slowly mount but no victory is in sight. Approximately 70 percent of the American people support the war, but they are not "hawks" in the sense in which that term is normally used. They are anti-Communist; they expect Americans to win wars in which they are engaged; and they have confidence that if American strength and ingenuity are applied in full measure, a victory over any enemy can be achieved. When these confident expectations encounter difficulty in fulfillment, majority sentiment is just as likely to swing in the opposite direction in favor of a quick peace settlement on whatever terms can be achieved. The Korean War was not unpopular in 1950, but when it settled down into a stalemate, the majority of Americans elected General Eisenhower to settle the war as best he could. In short, support for the Vietnam war is widespread but it is thin.

If the war were to end before November, 1968 in a dramatic, decisive victory, President Johnson would quickly be reestablished as a favorite for reelection. He would not, of course, win by the stupefyingly large margin he achieved over Barry Goldwater, but he would nonetheless probably win. However, even the optimists in the Administration do not anticipate a clearcut victory. What they do see is a firm consolidation of American military dominance in South Vietnam, so firm that there will not be much dispute about the fact of it, either from Hanoi or from domestic critics of the war. Already, the United States is close to that indisputable supremacy, but it is not yet so overwhelming as to be clearly visible.

When President Johnson tells Senator Robert Kennedy that "in six months, you doves will be dead politically," it is upon this kind of military edge he is relying. It would mean in Vietnam that American control of northern and central South Vietnam was unchallengeable and only a slow siege of the Viet Cong in the villages of the Mekong Delta remained. It would mean in the United States that Mr. Johnson could go to the country with the argument that although the fighting was not over, the war had been effectively won, and peace based on hard-won military superiority was only a matter of time. Whether this would be a winning theme is debatable, but it would at least give the Democrats a fifty-fifty chance.

Forms of Escalation

What President Johnson cannot afford to do is to go into the campaign with the war no nearer to being won than it is now and with nothing changed except an increase in the number of casualties. Under these circumstances, defeat would be almost certain. This estimate of the political realities underlies the widespread belief that Mr. Johnson may radically escalate the war in an effort to force a quick decision. The President, however, is aware that an escalation that brought Chinese ground troops or Russian pilots and sophisticated weapons into the war on the side of North Vietnam—as an invasion of North Vietnam might well do—would make a decision recede, rather than come closer. He has repeatedly re-

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jected suggestions to mine the harbor of Haiphong because of his concern that blowing up Russian ships would complicate his relations with the Soviet Union. The same caution appears to rule out an invasion of North Vietnam. One form of escalation is possible, that is the bombing of the Red River dikes that would bring major flooding and wipe out a sizable part of the North Vietnamese food supply. Since Mr. Johnson wants to force Ho Chi Minh to negotiate peace on our terms but does not want to destroy North Vietnam, he has repeatedly rebuffed suggestions that he bomb the dikes. Whether he may change his mind in the coming months is conjectural but the possibility cannot be excluded.

Since the Democrats are the majority party in the nation, the Republicans cannot win the election; the Democrats have to cooperate by losing it. The management of the war is the only issue with the dynamic potential to bring about the overthrow of the "in's." Racial fears, resentment over what are regarded as high taxes, and dissatisfaction over various Great Society programs, as well as dislike for Mr. Johnson's personality and political style, could all have an effect, but they would only be secondary factors.

If the Democrats are fated to lose the election because of frustration over the war, it scarcely matters who the Republicans nominate or what line he takes on the war. A great tide of negative feeling because of a war or a depression can sweep in candidates as diverse as Warren Harding, Franklin D. Roosevelt, or Dwight Eisenhower. Any of the four major G.O.P. possibilities—former Vice President Nixon, Governor Romney, Senator Percy, and Governor Nelson Rockefeller—could win. (Even Governor Reagan could quite conceivably be elected, but that is a prospect too doleful to contemplate.) Of the leading four, Rockefeller has the least chance of getting the nomination because he has the most confirmed enemies in the party, but he would make the strongest candidate, winning many Democratic and independent votes, and probably the best President.

Romney is an effective campaigner, looks like a President, makes a good off-the-cuff speech, and is physically tireless. If he could only get himself squared away on the Vietnam issue, he would make a formidable candidate. Although he has shown an extraordinary talent for tangling himself in his own words in talking about Vietnam, he will probably devise some verbal formula that will carry him safely through the presidential primaries. As of now, Nixon has to be considered the probable nominee because of his deep strength among the party regulars. For fifteen years, he has been shaking hands, attending bean suppers, and raising money for state and local candidates. His reservoir of goodwill among his fellow partisans is deep. But Nixon has the smell of defeat about him. Only if he tops Romney in one or more primaries can he get the nomination. If Romney and Nixon battle one another to a stalemate, Percy hopes to emerge the compromise choice; his chances of doing so are small but just good enough to be credible. His experience in public office is brief, but in 1940, the party nominated Wendell Willkie, another glamorous businessman, and his political experience was nonexistent.

Nixon is thus far a super-hawk on Vietnam and Percy mildly a dove, with Romney wavering and Rockefeller silent. But the logic of the Republican position is inescapable regardless of the identity of the nominee. The G.O.P. will not disavow the war, will not promise to widen it, and will not promise to end it overnight. Instead, the Republicans will simply promise to re-examine everything and do everything better; Mr. Johnson's "credibility gap," Secretary Rusk's diplomacy, and Secretary McNamara's purchasing of military hardware will be subject to severe attack. The strategy will be to pick up votes across the entire spectrum of the disaffected from retired Air Force General LeMay to the Quakers. No one will be quite satisfied with the Republican position, but if all are agreed for whatever reasons that Johnson must go, then their particular dissatisfactions will scarcely matter.

WILLIAM V. SHANNON

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ALL THINGS CONSIDERED

A CHANGE OF EDITORS

This week various changes in this magazine's masthead, previously announced, go into effect. Chief among them is the shift of Edward S. Skillin from Editor to Publisher and of myself from Managing Editor to Editor. This is an occasion that calls for two things: a statement of gratitude to the outgoing Editor and a statement of intention by me.

There can be no question of the debt *Commonweal* owes to Edward S. Skillin. Now entering his 35th year with the magazine, he has been Editor for 29 of those years. He has seen good days—comparatively—and bad. Soon after he became Editor, *Commonweal* began to receive subscription cancellations because of the magazine's refusal to join the American Catholic chorus of praise for Franco during the Spanish Civil War; as his tenure drew to an end, cancellations were being received for the magazine's opposition to the war in Vietnam. Through all these years, Edward Skillin has given of his energies and talents without stint, and the magazine is greatly in his debt for the dedication and continuity he supplied. With a circulation twice that of the pre-Council *Commonweal,*

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the magazine faces ever more complex fiscal and managerial problems. Handling such problems has always been in Mr. Skillin's domain, and now he finds it necessary to devote all his time to these increasingly demanding tasks. Those of us who have worked closely with him know with what dedication he will handle his responsibility as Publisher.

Will this shift in editorial duties mean a change in policy? No, not at all. This has always been a magazine where being Editor meant being first among equals, and there will be no change on that. All of us here realize that we cannot stand still, that we must respond to the signs of the times. At the same time we are highly conscious of the relevance of *Commonweal*'s past endeavors to our present concerns; we are very much aware of the value of the magazine's tradition.

What is that tradition? It is a tradition of civility, a tradition of reason. In an age when passions run high, *Commonweal* has always placed great value on dialogue, on the role of intelligence in human affairs. I hope it will do no less in the years ahead. But the *Commonweal* tradition is in no less a sense one of involvement. During the years since its founding in 1924, the magazine has met and grappled with almost every tough issue that has arisen, from Father Coughlin to Senator McCarthy, from the problems of depression to the problems of affluence, from the Spanish Civil War to the fighting in Vietnam. This *Commonweal* tradition of confrontation will also be continued.

Is *Commonweal* a Catholic magazine? This is a question people often ask. If to be Catholic means to be an organ of the Church or of some official organization in the Church, the answer is obviously "no." The hierarchy has certainly given us no special mandate to speak. Nor can we claim to be the voice of the Catholic laity as a group—who can? If these things are what is meant by being Catholic, we would have to abdicate all claim.

For all of its life, however, *Commonweal* has been accepted as in some sense a Catholic publication, and with reason. The magazine is and has always been published by a small group of journalists who are themselves Catholic. They are men who are concerned with Catholicism, and with the meeting of spiritual and temporal. It is this characteristic that has primarily distinguished *Commonweal* from other journals of opinion.

It is a fact, too, and not without significance, that most of our readers and many of our writers are also Catholics who have comparable interests. Such readers look to us for our views as Catholic laymen on the Church and the world, and such writers turn to us precisely because in our pages they can express these same concerns.

Then too we have many non-Catholic readers and writers, and this also we would cite as part of being Catholic. Our non-Catholic readers look to us for a certain kind of Catholic thinking. Our non-Catholic writers know they are welcome in our pages because we conceive of the Catholic spirit as one which welcomes good thinking and good writing, wherever found. In this sense too *Commonweal* has always been Catholic and thus always ecumenical, and I trust it always will be.

One thing that we do consider important about the *Commonweal* is that it is published and edited by laymen. This is not because we believe in any spirit of layman vs. clergy—quite the contrary, and many of our most valued contributors and supporters over the years have been priests, religious and bishops. Nonetheless, there is danger in our time of an excessively clerical Church, and it is good to have a counter to this tendency. One such counter is supplied by a lay magazine like *Commonweal.*

On day-to-day issues, what is *Commonweal*'s point of view? We are not committed to any political party or ism, but in general our approach is what people describe—approvingly or disapprovingly—as "liberal." We favor reform in social and political affairs and freedom in intellectual and cultural matters. We look first to the needs of the poor and all those unjustly treated in our society; we are particularly concerned with the sins committed by our society in its pride of race. We take seriously the principles of the social encyclicals and of papal peace efforts; we see no reason to imagine that traditional Christian principles suddenly become irrelevant in Vietnam because the United States is involved. Above all, we believe that Christians cannot remain aloof, that we must take stands, even at the risk of being wrong on occasion. In all these matters, *Commonweal* will not change.

Finally, what of the role of *Commonweal* in the Church? On this score too the magazine is "liberal"; as far as we were concerned, Pope John's breath of fresh air was welcome and, indeed, overdue. Over the years, the editors of this magazine always stressed that its major concern was with the temporal order, which has often been called the specific province of the layman, and the pages of *Commonweal* generally reflected this claim. In recent years, though, it has become obvious that laymen must play a larger role not only as Christians in the temporal order but inside the Church as well. Thinking about the Church cannot be a purely clerical concern. For this reason, *Commonweal* has increasingly opened its pages to material that would once have been thought "too theological" for us. This trend too can be expected to continue, with our sympathies unabashedly on the side of reform and renewal inside the Church.

What, then, is the role of *Commonweal?* It is to be concerned with both Church and world; it is to speak to the world in the accents of the Church, and to speak to the Church in the accents of the world. Indeed, if there is one piece of wisdom that is obvious after 42 years of publication, it is this fact, that the dialogue between Church and world is a two-way affair, and that each stands in need of the other. It is my hope that the *Commonweal* of tomorrow, like that of yesterday, will contribute to this dialogue.

JAMES O'GARA

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DOES THE U.S. EXPLOIT THE DEVELOPING NATIONS?

Systematically preserving world poverty

DAVID S. FRENCH

When President Julius Nyerere set about nationalizing banks and industries in Tanzania earlier this year, he explained his action as an attempt to free Tanzania from the influence of those foreign "parasites" who had historically been "exploiters of Africa." Something of the same spirit has characterized Congolese spokesmen in justifying their seizure of Union Minière assets in the Congo (Kinshasa). And from his position in exile, Kwame Nkrumah continues to condemn what he considers to be the West's predatory economic behavior throughout the African continent.

Charges of Western economic exploitation are not confined to Africa, but these recent events point up dramatically the need to arrive at some common understanding of what constitutes genuinely "exploitative" economic relationships between developed and developing nations. This need is particularly acute in the United States, which is most vulnerable to such accusations, if only because of the extent of its economic penetration abroad: at the end of 1965, America's direct foreign investments totalled $20 billion in all areas outside of Canada and Europe. And these investments have proved unusually profitable; over the two years 1964-65, American annual earnings on investment averaged 23 percent in Africa, 36 percent in Asia, and 13 percent in Latin America, as opposed to slightly more than 9 percent in Europe and Canada.

Such investments, moreover, are far from an unqualified boon to the balance-of-payments positions of recipient nations. Over the last six years, American transfers of investment capital abroad were $2 billion less than American income on these investments. For many developing states, this characteristic capital outflow constitutes a serious economic problem. In India, for example, foreign exchange losses on private capital account were nearly three times gross foreign investment over the critical period 1948-61. These data are not the whole story, of course; but they are taken seriously by those who hold to "parasite" theories of international economic activities.

The question remains, is all this really "exploitation?" To provide an answer in terms which can be accepted by all participants in the debate, it is necessary first to escape the conceptual fetters of both Marxism and doctrinaire capitalism. Accordingly, I reject here the simplistic labor theory of value adopted by Kwame Nkrumah, who argues that all Western profits on investment, whether repatriated or reinvested, amount to pillaging the developing nations involved. I also contend that lapses into Western international economic theory will be largely without meaning. Except in the most limited of senses, it is not a sufficient response to a charge of exploitation to argue that the natives are better off than would have been the case in the absence of foreign capital or trade. Simply because Ghana has a comparative advantage in cocoa exports to the United States does not in itself prove that the relationship is not an exploitative one.

These are caveats which we must accept if we are to communicate in any meaningful way with the developing world. At best, any insistence on the necessarily benign workings of a "free" world market lays us open to a charge of hypocrisy. At worst, posturings about the God-given economic right (of others) to be poor ring in foreign ears like racist polemic. After all, we have not expected our own people to observe the full impact of the market mechanism: one has only to mention Ameri-

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can agriculture and textile production to realize this. The difference is simply that nobody in the southern hemisphere has the vote here, while agriculturalists and industrialists in America have not only this but congressional lobbies as well. This is a historical fact—it does not mean that the world economic order is "natural," or "equitable," or "benign." It is precisely the accuracy of these labels that we must reassess.

Let me then propose a working definition of "exploitation." I believe that we could reasonably call the relationship between the United States and the developing world exploitative if two conditions were met. First, we would need to show that the nature of the world's present—and arbitrary—economic order, including the institutions which sustain it, is such as to work toward a permanent widening of the division between rich and poor nations, as well as toward generally chaotic economic conditions in developing states. Second, we would have to demonstrate that the United States is in a systematic way working to preserve this economic order. This approach may have less esthetic purity than pronouncements on comparative advantage or surplus value, but it provides a definitional area of debate within which critics of greatly differing political persuasions could operate.

It is undeniably the case that income in developing nations is now increasing far less rapidly than in developed states. In part, this follows from financial, institutional, and skills barriers within the developing world. At least as important, however, are economic conditions over which poorer nations have little control. Most of these states, for example, are dependent on exports of primary products, which amount to about eight times the value of manufactured exports throughout the developing world. Trade in primary goods is subject to great annual fluctuations: since 1959, to note an extreme case, year-to-year changes in the unit value of cocoa have averaged 15 per cent. As a result of these tendencies, from 1948 to 1963 annual export fluctuations of 25 percent or more occurred in developing countries on the average of once every five years, twice as often as for developed states.

Nor is there a readily apparent way out, as developing nations are discouraged from expanding exports other than in primary products by prohibitively high effective tariffs imposed by developed states. As a result, poor nations are chronically beset by shortages of foreign exchange required for development projects. As Sidney Dell, now in the New York offices of the U. N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), has noted, "this in turn compels them to beg continually for economic aid in order to secure the funds that they believe would be theirs by right in an equitable world trading system, instead of coming to them at the whim and fancy—and under the political pressures—of the richer nations of the world." It is not just what Americans like to call "unsound economic policies," then, that restrain the growth of the developing world; the structure of the international economy is a weight of at least equal significance.

Along lines dictated by the developed nations, this economic structure has been codified in such instruments as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Charter of the International Monetary Fund, which inhibit fundamental attacks on problems of the developing world. According to the current ground rules, no general system of tariff preferences for goods of developing states would be possible, nor would tariff reductions on a basis of non-reciprocity from these states be likely. Even proposals for reform have tended to institutionalize problems more serious than those to be solved: when the World Bank published a study on supplementary financial measures in 1965, it included in the mandate of the administering agency effective veto power over development policies of the nations affected. Given the predilections of the World Bank family, which would probably control such a scheme, it is clear that access to this facility would be in direct proportion to the fiscal conservatism and devotion to private enterprise of participating countries.

Essentially, the nature of the world economy offers little but despair to developing nations, and there is no relief in sight. In full recognition that the developing world is economically prostrate, capitalist nations have but two suggestions. Developing countries can grant concessions sufficient to attract massive private capital, thereby turning critical development decisions over to foreign investors. Or for marginal needs which cannot be met privately, there is foreign aid—with all its political ramifications. This is what Nkrumah has described with some accuracy as the "sugared water of aid . . . the stop-gap between avid hunger and the hoped-for greater nourishment that never comes."

Complacency and Opposition

The developed nations' complacency in the face of all this is truly monumental. Consider the analysis of current world economic conditions by the World Bank, which generally speaks for the United States in international economic affairs. Admitting that the volume of export earnings will be critical to developing-nation progress, the bank says only that this "depends to a considerable extent upon the level of production in the industrial countries, on which the developing countries must rely for 80 percent of their export sales as well as virtually all of their net inflows of capital."

What is good for the rich is good for the poor, the Bank announces; and what is best for the rich? "The continued swift growth of the industrial countries, as well as some replenishment of their stocks of primary materials, which will depend in part on *the state of international tension,* may well increase their demand for imports from the developing countries at a higher rate than last year." (My italics.) In the face of unrelieved deterioration in

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the relative economic position of the developing world, the Bank offers only the hope of a bigger, better, and more expensive Vietnam war.

The situation above does not reflect simply a lack of initiative on the part of the developed nations. Rather, these nations—and particularly the United States—have actively opposed virtually every proposal by UNCTAD or the developing states to correct these conditions. The American attitude was made painfully clear at the 1964 UNCTAD meeting in Geneva. At the conclusion of this session, a series of general principles was adopted to govern international trade relations. General Principle One reads in full: "Economic relations between countries, including trade relations, shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality of states, self-determination of peoples, and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries." 113 nations voted for the adoption of this principle; one—the United States—voted against. Of 15 such principles adopted, the United States voted against or abstained from voting on 11; in four of these cases, America's was the only negative vote.

A more recent case was the United States' sabotage of the 1966 Cocoa Conference, held in New York during May and June. America alone refused to agree to an area of compromise in which all other participating states, developed or developing, had concurred; and the conference ended in anger. The delegate of Ghana suggested that the American cocoa industry, which wants "a commodity produced by cheap sweated labor," had influenced the United States position. The Brazilian representative also regretted that the United States had "not been able to negotiate on the basis accepted by all the other countries," and the delegate of Cameroon interpreted the outcome as showing that one "of the most prosperous states did not subscribe to the idea of finding effective remedies to under-development." Utterly isolated, the United States delegate maintained that the negotiations had been "fruitful."

In addition, the United States has worked consistently to weaken or scuttle such proposals as those for preferential tariffs on produce of developing nations, for international monetary reform aimed directly at needs of the developing world, and for concessionary finance in quantities sufficient to allow a real attack on problems of development. And we have acted with some condescension in rejecting these and other initiatives. Discussing last November a United Nations resolution designed to increase the proportion of resources received by developing nations from exploitation of their natural resources, the United States delegate explained his abstention from voting as a function of doubt over whether the resolution really served the interests of developing nations. These nations, who like to believe they can themselves determine their interests, evidently felt otherwise; the final vote was 104 to 0, with the United States and a handful of Western nations abstaining.

A recurrent theme in this summary is American isolation in international economic debate. Although sometimes joined by a few Western allies, the United States not infrequently stands completely alone. This point has been illustrated above; it is underscored by a further look at United Nations action on key economic issues at the last session of the General Assembly. One resolution on external financing of economic development was approved 99 to 0; the United States and four other nations abstained. Another measure on the flow of external resources to developing nations was passed 98 to 0; the United States and ten other nations abstained. And on a vote reaffirming the urgency of concluding an international cocoa agreement, which has come to take on considerable symbolic significance as a measure of willingness to attack basic problems of world trade, the United States alone abstained; the resolution was adopted by a vote of 110 to 0. For most of these measures, American participation would be necessary for success, and American abstention constituted an effective veto of actions proposed.

It may be said that it is foolish to expect America to act against what it sees to be its economic interests; and this is correct, although irrelevant. It may also be said that America is acting as a bastion of "objective" behavior in international economic affairs; and while this is at least open to debate, it is also irrelevant. No rich nation can long argue to an audience of the poor the rationality of a system which ceaselessly works to widen the disparity between them: as Frantz Fanon has noted in a parallel context, "For the native, objectivity is always directed against him." The tone of debate today when, say, African and American clash in international forums is reminiscent of the arrival of the first New Dealers in Hoover's Washington. Learned Hand anticipated the present confrontation in 1934: "The Filii Aurorae . . . are so conceited, so insensitive, so arrogant. But on the whole the Old Tories are intellectually so moribund . . . so stupid and emit such dreary, hollow sounds." In the 1930's, America gladly improvised in the face of an intolerable economic situation, even when this conflicted with economic orthodoxy. In the 1960's, the heirs of the New Deal have themselves become the dreary spokesmen for an orthodoxy which is as clearly unequal to a new economic situation.

The evidence is persuasive that the United States is working to preserve an international economic order which systematically works to the disadvantage of developing nations; and by my earlier definition, this constitutes a form of "exploitation" of these nations. Americans need to recognize this fact; most of the developing world has already done so. And it is a problem of some urgency; as Frantz Fanon has warned, "the question which is looming on the horizon is the need for a redistribution of wealth. Humanity must reply to this question, or be shaken to pieces by it." So far, there has been only a negative reply from the United States.

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Intellectuals in opposition

FROM ALGERIA TO VIETNAM

JEFFRY KAPLOW

American intellectuals who oppose the war in Vietnam are today on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, there is the knowledge that the war is morally and politically wrong and must be stopped. On the other, there is the increasing sense of impotence and frustration at our inability to move our government in that direction. It is all very well to sign petitions, to publish advertisements, and even to march in the streets of New York, San Francisco, and Washington several hundred thousand strong. Our souls, whose demands must also be met, are nourished by our righteousness, but the war goes on. And the question still remains: what can we do?

Misery, the old adage goes, loves company, and in this case we Americans have plenty of it. We now have to face up to a problem that has troubled thinking people in every colonialist country at one time or another, when their nations have engaged in unjust and repressive colonial wars. Our situation may be complicated by the fact that we are citizens of the strongest nation and that our responsibilities are thereby increased beyond comparison to those of any other national group, but we are still fundamentally in the same boat with regard to Vietnam that the British found themselves in with regard to Indian rebellions fifty years ago, and the French with regard to the Algerian Revolution just a decade ago. As a practicing historian, I am well aware that history teaches no lessons, and that historical analogies are often treacherous. Nevertheless, a few comparisons may be instructive.

Although Vietnam has never legally been a colony of the United States as Algeria was of France, the parallels between the two situations are extraordinarily great. In both instances, we are dealing with colonial wars of liberation which have acquired at least the passive, and more often than not the active, support of the majority of the population. In both instances great Western powers, in cooperation with some elements of the local ruling elite, have rushed to suppress the liberation movement in the name of freedom and democracy, and with the avowed purpose of making the world safe from Communism. In Vietnam as in Algeria, the colonial armies have resorted to torture and terrorism and to the creation of concentration camps euphemistically termed *centres de regroupment* or strategic hamlets. In both places the troops have been stimulated to action by clever use of racist propaganda, the Arab peril being to the Frenchman what the yellow peril is to the American.

The parallels do not end there. In Algeria the French used their paratroops as we do our special forces in Vietnam, as agents of counter-revolutionary guerrilla warfare. And American officers are taking a hint from their French comrades in arms by reading Mao and perhaps wondering in what part of the globe they will be called on to defend the free world next. In a word, American intervention in Vietnam poses the same threat to the maintenance of democracy and social progress at home as the French presence in Algeria did. The tendency to ignore and/or suppress dissent, the allocation of funds to the genocidal destruction of a civilization rather than to the construction of a good (but not, God help us, a Great) society are but two of the more obvious aspects of this threat.

So much for the comparisons, although more might be made. What must interest us here is the response of the French intellectuals to the questions posed by the Algerian war.

At the outset in 1954 and 1955, that response was extraordinarily mild. A few voices raised in protest, but the great majority of Frenchmen, intellectuals and others, were not sure of their ground. They wondered about the legitimacy of Algerian demands and whether the FLN was representative of popular opinion. When a group of draftees showed their unwillingness to be sent to Algeria in 1955 by preventing the departure of a troop train for several hours in a Paris railroad station, the response of all the left parties was first bewilderment and then disapproval. Only after the episode of February, 1956, in Algiers, when Premier Guy Mollet gave in to the colonists' demands for strong measures against the rebels, did the intellectual community at large begin to understand what was going on. Even then, a combination of apathy, misinformation, and French chauvinism kept many from seeing the war in its true light. After all, could it not be argued that measured progress had been underway before the outbreak of the rebellion, that the rebels were fanatics, that they employed terror, and that they were not yet ready to guide their own destiny. In short, all the colonial shibboleths were trotted out, often to soothe an aching conscience. They are best summed up in the old argument: you say the colonists were imperialists, but I say they brought roads and schools.

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Equally responsible for the failure of Frenchmen to challenge their government's actions were the opposition parties, who did not perceive the connections between internal politics and colonial war, or, even worse, did not act on their perceptions, for fear of alienating their electors, who were presumed to be indifferent to the war. It took the dramatic fall of the Fourth Republic to shock the opposition into a reevaluation of its stand. The message of the coup d'état that brought de Gaulle to power in May, 1958, was very simply the following: that the army and the colons would stop at nothing in their drive to maintain French rule in Algeria, even if that meant the establishment of a dictatorship at home. For the moment, de Gaulle's availability had saved the day, although that was not immediately apparent. How far to the right would France be driven? Would fascism be the next step? It was easy to have these fears when faced with an army dominated by the extreme right, a general who might be a Hindenburg, if not a Franco, and a new constitution that minimized the traditional role of parliament. That things would work out quite differently was not then to be foreseen. Algiers had imposed its will on Paris, and Paris would not be free until Algeria was. Such was the conclusion around which a consensus began to form on the left, but the process was still slow.

In the years following on 1958, the French intellectuals included in the spectrum that ran from the left-wing Catholics to the Communists and beyond, played a very special role in regard to Algeria. They became the conscience of a nation. Even as the parties began to call for immediate peace negotiations, they sometimes got caught up in a web of petty rivalries and bickerings that limited the utility of their action. It was then that the students, teachers, and professional people, together, it should be noted, with numerous rank and file members of the trade unions, took the lead in organizing agitation. They looked to all the world like the French equivalent of the members of Women Strike for Peace or the well dressed marchers in a typical peace parade, and they were undergoing a similar evolution.

The Opposition

At first, opposition to the war was limited to the signing of petitions and street demonstrations, and the call was for negotiations with the FLN. Needless to say, the police were not friendly to these activities, as numerous broken heads will bear witness. But even police brutality was unable to dampen the spirits of the demonstrators, and they returned to the charge many times. And as more demonstrations took place, each successive one became more radical, until the common slogan became not merely for negotiations, but Algeria for the Algerians.

For the great majority, protest against the war never went beyond this phase, often for lack of opportunities. A very few did carry the struggle further. Several thousand young men, banded together in an organization known as *Jeune Résistance,* refused to be drafted for service in Algeria, and consequently were forced to live clandestinely or to flee France for the duration. They were given moral support in the fall of 1960 by the Declaration of the 121 who urged all French youth to follow their example of non-cooperation. The propaganda effect of the Declaration, signed by Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Simone Signoret among others, was enormous. The government punished those who were civil servants by suspensions from their jobs, but refused to indict their more famous colleagues. It wound up looking ridiculous, and did not succeed in breaking up the solidarity of the group, who soon added many more persons to their ranks.

Of all the opponents of the Algerian war, only a few hundred went so far as to identify their cause with the FLN. Those who did argued that a victory for the FLN, good in itself because it would guarantee the birth of a socialist Algeria, was the prerequisite for the resumption of normal politics in France. So long as Algeria was in bondage, so long would the threat of fascism in France remain and the left be constrained to a defensive posture, unable to move toward the positive goals. Patriotism to them was an empty sham that could only serve the interests of the right, and international solidarity constituted a higher law.

Frenchmen who refused to fight in Algeria acted with moral integrity, but they in no way influenced the outcome of the war. Those who aided the FLN by carrying messages and collecting funds in some small way could claim a positive contribution. But what is extraordinary is the political effect of the thousands who did no more than manifest their discontent by demonstrating in the streets. History will record that de Gaulle made peace in Algeria, and that he did so because the game was no longer worth the candle, given his conception of French *grandeur*. Will it also record that in order to make peace, he had to free himself from dependence on the army, that he had to appear to be moving in accord with the desires of the French people? The demonstrators gave him both a push and an excuse, and he seized both brilliantly. That de Gaulle was the executor of the peace in no way minimizes the importance and the effectiveness of the protest movement in the affair.

But the case of French withdrawal from Algeria was in many ways unique. For all its faults, the French already possessed a left opposition before the war became a crucial issue. They also had a strong tradition of militant protest, and intellectuals were used to taking part in politics. There was, in a word, room for maneuver, even in the context of an authoritarian state. It was the combination of these factors that finally allowed the anti-war forces to make themselves heard and to contribute to the conclusion of a peace.

The United States today does not have the apparatus the French had. There is no strong left, no tradition of

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protest in regard to foreign policy, and intellectuals have no acknowledged role in the nation's affairs. The only advantage we do have, and it is an important one, is the right to organize and speak out. More and more people are being drawn into anti-war activities, and greater numbers of them than ever before are prepared to make the demand that the United States withdraw from Vietnam immediately and unconditionally. The peace movement is being radicalized, and it has reached an important turning point.

Marching is an occasional activity. Politics go on from day to day. If opponents of the war are to make an impact, they must have a political organization. The argument goes on as to what kind of organization that ought to be. It is just possible that action within the Democratic Party, including the running of peace candidates, may help to form an anti-Johnson consensus in 1968 and/or convince Washington that the United States presence in Vietnam is too heavy a political liability to bear. Bobby and all the Kennedys are waiting in the wings, ready to capitalize on the growing demand for peace. I, for one, admit that the prospect of having to rely on the Establishment Opposition leaves me totally cold, although nothing that may bring peace ought to be dismissed out of hand. The point is that Vietnam is not an isolated instance of United States intervention against revolutionary movements. The peace that Kennedy might bring to Vietnam would carry no guarantees about the future of Thailand or Cambodia, not to mention Latin America or Africa, where the U.S. is also active.

There is some talk now among intellectuals of an alternative solution, the organization of a Third Party. The talk is a healthy sign that intellectuals at last may be ready to assume their political responsibilities, but there are many problems. A party focused uniquely on the issue of peace and war and composed only of intellectuals is doomed to failure from the start. In order to be viable, such a party would have to appeal to a wide spectrum of the poor and discontented in the United States, and it would have to make explicit the connections that exist between foreign and domestic policy, while proposing radical structural changes in American society as a whole. If a third party is what we want, then we peacemongers have got to return Martin Luther King's compliment and "go domestic." Until now, the absence of an organized opposition in the United States has caused a fragmentation of the issues, and has consequently limited the effectiveness of protests around any one of them. It is this obstacle that must now be overcome. There is no magic formula, and union around a series of issues is only a prerequisite, not a guarantee, of political success. It is our only chance, if we want to lose our feeling of impotence and to become an effective part of the new world now being born.

A Protestant Viewpoint

PAUL VI'S SECULAR ECUMENISM

ROBERT McAFEE BROWN

In a sermon delivered during the Christian Unity Octave a year ago, Fr. Avery Dulles, S.J., made the comment: "Ecumenism has become too exclusively taken up with religious questions—with matters of doctrine and worship . . . From many quarters therefore one hears the call for a new ecumenism—one less committed to historical theological controversies and more in touch with contemporary secular man; one less turned in upon itself, more open to the world and its concerns.The greatest decisions affecting man's future are being made in the sphere of the secular; and Christianity does not seem to be there."

It is in this context that the new papal encyclical, *Populorum Progressio,* can best be seen. Tons of printers ink have already been spilled over it, with reactions ranging all the way from the *Wall Street Journal*'s dismissal of the document as a kind of warmed-over Marxism, through *Time* magazine's unaccountable discounting of its importance to the American scene, to what have mainly been exceedingly positive and affirmative appraisals. At a later time I may want to comment on the substance of the document, but I am more immediately concerned with its context than its content, and its helpful impetus to the kind of concern for "secular ecumenism" that Fr. Dulles so ably describes.

Until recently, Catholicism and Protestantism pursued separate paths in dealing with "social issues." Although both bodies have tried to relate the gospel to the life of contemporary man, there has been a notable lack of common endeavor. The Catholic path follows the well-known landmarks of *Rerum Novarum, Quadragesimo Anno,* and *Mater et Magistra. Pacem in Terris* and "Schema

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Thirteen" of the Council, the pastoral constitution on "The Church and the World Today" (*Gaudium et Spes*), initiate a new sequence, for they are addressed not exclusively to Catholics but to "all men of good will," and they presage the beginnings of ecumenical cooperation in the specific nitty gritty of modern life. The recent books by Fr. Peter Riga, *Peace on Earth* (Herder and Herder) and *The Church Made Relevant* (Fides) provide commentaries on these documents that can be exceedingly useful to Catholics and Protestants alike.

The Protestant path proceeds through the two early Life and Work Conferences of pre-World Council days, Stockholm 1925 (dealing with economics and industry, international relations, education, and church cooperation on practical matters) and Oxford 1937 (dealing with such issues as church and state, education, and the economic order). Not until last summer at Geneva was the theme picked up again in a central way, at a major conference on "The Christian in the Social and Technical Revolutions of Our Time," although each of the major world assemblies (Amsterdam 1948, Evanston 1954 and New Delhi 1961) devoted considerable attention to such themes as international disorder, the struggle for world community, and the church amid racial and ethnic tensions. But the Geneva conference, like *Pacem in Terris* and "The Church and the World Today," belongs to a new sequence, for although its deliberations were the direct responsibility of Protestant and Orthodox members of the World Council, those deliberations were sparked and leavened by the presence of eight Roman Catholic "observers" who were really participants, and three further Roman Catholic "special guests" who were equally participants. In a less obvious and official way, the Protestant and Orthodox observers at Vatican II also made their own comments on "The Church and the World Today" during the period of its deliberations.

A converging of the roads is therefore taking place in the area of "secular ecumenism." There remain still many intramural problems that Catholics and Protestants will consider apart from one another, but when it comes to their concerns for the civic, political, economic and social life of man they already can and increasingly will make common cause. And this is the point at which *Populorum Progressio* becomes so ecumenically significant. For just as the Geneva conference picked up on many of the issues dealt with in "The Church and the World Today," so *Populorum Progressio* carries further the discussion of many of the issues that were central at Geneva.

But the ecumenical impact is even more far-reaching. For the fourth world assembly of the World Council of Churches, to be held in Uppsala in July 1968, will give further attention to the problem of the church and the world today, under the theme, "Behold, I Make All Things New," and in addition to the various study guides now being prepared under World Council auspices, it is clear that *Populorum Progressio* must be one of the basic documents. It will contribute directly to discussion and conclusions in at least the following areas designated for deliberation at Uppsala: "the church in mission," "the church's role in social and economic development," "the church's role in international affairs," and "towards a new style of living." It will also have some things to say at least indirectly about the other two assembly topics, "the church's unity in a shrinking world" and "the worship of God in a secular age." It must be hoped, therefore, that the encyclical will be included among the major documents to be studied in preparation for the Uppsala assembly, and that a large number of Roman Catholic theologians will be officially invited to that assembly, not simply to exegete *Populorum Progressio,* but to add their wisdom to the decisions that World Council members will be making. The extraordinarily creative presence of the Roman Catholics at the Geneva conference gives hope that such reciprocity will soon be taken for granted at all ecumenical gatherings.

Positive response to the encyclical among World Council executives presages even closer collaboration in "secular ecumenism" in the future. As Eugene Carson Blake, the general secretary of the World Council, put it, "All Christian Churches, and, I am sure, the World Council of Churches, long active in the work of development for peace, will welcome the invitation of the encyclical to collaborate—on the basis of their loyalty to Christ and His Gospel to serve the world—in surveying the route, in laying the foundations, and in smoothing the way. Out of such Christian collaboration all men of good will from diverse faiths and cultures can be encouraged to bring their gifts, insights and visions and can march together in hope, as they always have in the great forward movements of civilization and human culture."

Roman Slow-down

There is another ecumenical dimension to the encyclical that should not be ignored. It is no secret that for the past year or so Protestants have been made increasingly apprehensive by the sounds emanating from Rome. The impression has been created that those within the Vatican and the Curia have become fearful, if not reduced to panic, that the Roman Catholic Church is threatened with dissolution and that a firm and conservative hand must be wielded by the highest authority to reverse tendencies toward too rapid *aggiornamento*. Whether this has been related to restrictions on liturgical experimentation, to the refusal to accept the resignations of aged cardinals, or to warnings against theological innovation, the message in each case has appeared to be the same: slow down, be cautious, all things in God's good time, give no cause of scandal to the faithful. It has appeared, at least to the outsider, that the Council was being viewed as a mixed blessing at best, and that in terms of the intramural life of the Roman Catholic church, the next few years were going to

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be ones of retrogression rather than advance.

But in the extramural concerns of the pope, a very different voice is being sounded. This has been symbolized by his consistent concern for peace and specifically for a settlement in Vietnam—a concern in which he has been far ahead of most of his fellow bishops elsewhere—and now by the new encyclical. For *Populorum Progressio* is not putting on the brakes, nor is it simply repeating the ideas of *Rerum Novarum, Quadragesimo Anno, Mater et Magistra* and *Pacem in Terris.* It picks up on the ideas in those encyclicals to be sure, but it does not stand still. And it is notable that the document most frequently quoted is "The Church and the World Today," to which sixteen references are made, just as it is notable that among those theologians directly cited are men like M.D. Chenu and Henri de Lubac, who until recently were under the shadow of a thick cloud created by what was then known as the Holy Office.

What this suggests ecumenically, I believe, is that on the front of common concern for mankind, Pope Paul is taking vigorous and dynamic leadership, and that in this increasingly central part of the ecumenical task, non-Catholics will have to scramble simply to keep up with him. His concerns here can be symbolized by what is probably the most brilliant single line of the entire encyclical, "The new name for peace is development." (para. 87) This suggests that there can be nothing static in Christian bodies, joining forces with "all men of goodwill," must be continually open to what they learn from the world about them, and adopt the posture proper to a church trying to be the servant of that world. (The openness is symbolized even at the most ambiguous point in the encyclical, dealing with population control, where it seems quite legitimate to discover a new attitude on the part of the church toward government responsibility for making birth control information available.)

It may be that this openness and outgoingness toward the world will continue to be paralleled, for a time at least, with a certain reserve and timidity about change within the Catholic church itself. But it can be predicted that the accelerated tempo in the extramural concern will sooner or later have its impact on the tempo of intramural concern. The Pope's visit to India, for example, and his viewing at first hand the poverty and human degradation that can result in centers of overpopulation, may be a more important influence on future Catholic teaching about birth control than even the most difficult paragraphs of *Casti Connubii.*

Fr. Dulles' statement, so descriptively true a year ago, that "the greatest decisions affecting man's future are being made in the sphere of the secular, and Christianity does not seem to be there," will become less and less descriptively true as the themes of "The Church and the World Today," the Geneva conference, *Populorum Progressio,* and the forthcoming Uppsala assembly come to speak *for* the churches and not simply *to* them.

BONDS AWAY

THE SCREEN

Ever since I read James M. Wall's cogent essay, "James Bond: Hero of Death and Destruction," in *Christian Advocate,* I have looked forward to seeing the next Bond movie and checking myself, on Wall's well-stated arguments. He contends that the Bond films contain many only-thinly disguised homosexual touches and that 007, himself, is a latent homo. Well, the new Bond picture, "Casino Royale," has arrived, but it is so vaguely based on the Ian Fleming novel and it departs so far from "Thunderball" and the other items in the series, that I can't check on anything. It doesn't even have Sean Connery playing the famed secret agent. But true to its advertising slogan ("Casino Royale" is too much for one James Bond), it does have a lot of Bonds; and it also has a lot of sound and fury signifying nothing.

As producer Charles K. Feldman states it: "We were determined to produce a spoof film, a different kind of movie." But since it's very hard to spoof a spoof (and the Bond films had already begun to spoof themselves), what "Casino Royale" seems to have become is an old-fashioned extravaganza, one of those big, elaborate spectacles with everything in it but the kitchen sink. Instead of a sink, however, they have a toilet on a revolving disc—so Mata Bond, the illegitimate daughter of the original James Bond and Mata Hari, can wisecrack about going around with a John. This joke, by the way, comes in the middle of this lengthy movie probably just to remind you that most, but not all, of the humor is on a high–school level like the opening shot that showed Peter Sellers, as one of the 007s, being interviewed in a pissoir.

It's hard to say just where and why "Casino Royale" went wrong. Too many cooks trying too hard to be too different? (The film has five directors who worked on various segments, but it's practically unfeasible to tell who did what; and it has three scriptwriters who were probably helped and hindered by all those stars ad libbing all over the place.) Or was the trouble too much money? (As the film went wilder and wilder, its expenses rose and are said to have hit $12 million.) Some of this money shows very well, and "Casino Royale" is extraordinarily beautiful at times in its handsome color photography of Scotland, London, and various other locales and interior sets varying from stately mansions to startling pop and op art.

But the story is something else again. It has a smattering of the Fleming novel, and it starts well enough with David Niven as the original and now Sir James Bond, a retired eccentric. He is persuaded by four international chiefs (Charles Boyer, John Huston, William Holden, Kurt Kasznar) to get back into service and help fight

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Smersh who are killing off secret agents like mad. Disapproving of the sex-gadget-gimmick maniacs who have been impersonating Bonds recently, Sir James hires new Bond 007s (Peter Sellers, Ursula Andress, Daliah Lavi, Terence Cooper, etc.) and sets them to work. From there on, don't try to follow the plot which becomes a mishmash sillier than anything in the old extravaganzas and trying much harder to be naughtier with its bevies of beautiful girls, double *entendres,* burlesques of 007 tortures and gadgets. Also involved in the complications are Deborah Kerr, Woody Allen, Orson Welles, and many others including youthful, svelte Joanna Pettet as the daughter of Mata Hara (who was killed in 1917) and Sir James (so figure that out if you can). Don't really try to figure out anything in "Casino Royale," especially the finale with its explosion of fights with Keystone Cops, cowboys, Indians, and mayhem. As Woody Allen says at one point, "We'll run amuck; and if you're too tired, we'll walk amuck." You'll be too tired.

Just to show that a film doesn't have to be big and expensive and pretentious to be amusing and thoughtful and occasionally ironical, there's an absorbing little Italian film called "Made in Italy." It consists of a series of vignettes, jokes, character sketches—all very Italian with their fine cast under Nanni Loy's direction, but still all very universal too. The film might have been called "The Way People Behave." Some of the sketches are very slight: a tourist couple in Florence looking for a certain Raphael get only stupid stares from natives but learn its location from fellow tourists; mourners gorging themselves while they weep at a wake; an exhausted day laborer listening at night to radio commercials about exercisers and other needs of the rich; a nun examining bridal dresses in a shop window; a beautiful shot of a hard-working woman in a field breast-feeding her baby; a heart-breaking shot of the very poor in an Italian hill town reading a poster asking for help for India.

Mixed with the short sketches are longer ones that develop their points more slowly: a snobbish young girl, after trying to impress her date, goes home—to a despicably mean father; the frustration of a man trying to apply for an identity card in a bureau lined with red tape; a wife comes home to find her husband in bed with another woman and winds up being blamed for his infidelity. On and on these fascinating themes go, commenting on men and woman and institutions. My favorite among these 20 to 30 vignettes is the one with Anna Magnani portraying a woman trying to get her brood—husband, mother-in-law and three children—across a busy Roman boulevard. It is a gem, and so, in its way, is the whole picture. You won't like all these people, and you don't always like yourself. But there they are: people and you: "Made in Italy" and made in the world. PHILIP T. HARTUNG

BOOKS

Fromm here to eternity

You Shall Be as Gods

ERICH FROMM

Holt, Rinehart and Winston, $4.95

ROLAND E. MURPHY

In *The Art of Loving* the biblical allusions of Dr. Fromm were not hard to take. They were little more than allusions—Jonah (love must involve labor), Adam and Eve (awareness of human separation), etc. They had a way of salting, if not reinforcing, his presentation of many psychological insights. But this book, sub-titled "A Radical Interpretation of the Old Testament and its Tradition," is something else. Dr. Fromm is telling us what the Old Testament means. Unfortunately he never gets outside of his best psychological bedside manner. The reviewer doubts that justice has been done to the Judaic tradition (to which the word "tradition" in the sub-title refers) by the many anecdotes and sayings quoted from Jewish sources. At any rate, the Old Testament has not been well served by the psychological and philosophical mish mash that is attributed to it.

The message is contained in four "concept" chapters: the concept of God, of Man, of History, and of Sin and Repentance. The reader is frankly advised that the author is not a theist, and that the interpretation is one of "radical humanism"—"a global philosophy which emphasizes the oneness of the human race, the capacity of man to develop his own powers and to arrive at inner harmony and at the establishment of a peaceful world." These are laudable ideals, and surely the Old Testament has something to say about them. But the difficulty is that these goals are *imposed* upon the biblical text; the author does not struggle with the text to discover what it has to say, or to see how it provides a starting point for development.

A first, and apparently necessary, step toward man's freedom, is to settle the concept of God. God is not dead, but he has become an *x* experience (" 'God' is one of the many different poetic expressions of the highest value in humanism, not a reality in itself"), either theistic or nontheistic. The basic biblical datum for this approach appears to be the nameless God. But this semi-modern agnosticism is not the meaning of *Exodus* 3:14. The thrust of the Lord's re-

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fusal to reveal his name ("I am who I am") is actually in the opposite direction from man's freedom and independence. It is God who is free and independent, and he is not to be controlled by names, as lesser beings are. Precisely here the thesis of the author ("man must become fully independent, and that means independent even from God") flatly contradicts the persistent Old Testament idea of God's supremacy. After all, it was the serpent who first suggested, "you shall be as gods."

A favorite principle of Dr. Fromm is that God does not change man; man is left to himself, to do by himself what no one else can do for him. The liberation from Egypt is supposed to illustrate the point. Yet, if there is anything in the Bible that rings clear, it is the sovereign gratuity by which the Lord himself frees Israel and fights for Israel. The same emphasis on God's activity is to be found in Old Testament prayer (cf. Jer 10:23; Prov 20:24). There is far more determinism and divine causality in the Bible than radical humanism can stand.

Such unhappy interpretations simply destroy the reader's confidence in the author, and it is too bad. Why should not a humanist succeed in making the Old Testament speak to us? His sensitivity to human values should prepare him to expound the depths of human experience in Israel's great religious leaders (although Moses and Job have not fared well at the hands of Freud and Jung). What is the meaning of the "confessions" of Jeremiah? The prophet complains bitterly; the Lord has "duped" him, and he faces inexplicable anguish. One reply of the Lord is itself a question that demands understanding: "If running against men has wearied you, how will you [illegible] gainst horses?" (Jer 12:5). These and similar passages call out for the studied response that a psychologist is well prepared to give.

A chapter on the Psalms is added at the end of the book, and here a new classification is offered: 66 "one-mood" psalms, 47 "dynamic" psalms, etc. This approach is contrasted with that of the great German scholar, Hermann Gunkel. But it is simply wooden, and if one takes the trouble to go to Gunkel directly (and not through Oesterley's commentary), the sensitive, as well as objective, literary perception of the German professor stands out.

You Shall Be as Gods is not an interpretation of the Old Testament; it is doctrinaire humanism served up with biblical garnish.

The Plebeians Rehearse the Uprising

GÜNTER GRASS

Harcourt, Brace, $4.50

MICHAEL ROLOFF

Günter Grass' short plays, such as *The Wicked Cooks, Flood Tide,* or *Uncle Uncle,* are amusing, obliquely symbolic and sinister charades. *The Plebeians Rehearse the Uprising,* his seventh play to be produced in Germany and the first which is full-length, dispenses with suggestive indirection and much of the playfulness of his previous work. It is the most outspoken, serious and ambitious of his plays.

Each of the chief ingredients of *Plebeians* has its inherent interest; together these ingredients contain the promise of an unusual and brilliant play. In brief, what Grass has united is an actual revolt of the East German workers against the Ulbricht government on June 17th, 1953, and a rehearsal by Bert Brecht and his East Berlin theatre of the uprising scene from Brecht's adaptation of Shakespeare's Coriolanus—an adaptation in which, conveniently for Grass' bitterly sardonic purposes, the plebeians were to be the decisive factor in the overthrow of the dictator, not the sorry cowards they are in Shakespeare's version.

In Grass' play the courageous East German workers send a delegation to Brecht asking his support in the form of an effectively worded statement. It is suggested that the right statement by Brecht will make all the difference to the outcome of the revolt. Thus at the very outset Grass diverges from what was and probably will always be the natural behavior of German workers under such circumstances; admittedly, he does so for dramatic purposes.

Brecht (or "boss" as he is called, though this designation is supposed to signify his standing among East German artists and does anything but veil his identity) equivocates, as in fact the real Bert Brecht (who was rehearsing a different play that day, without interruptions by insurrectionists) equivocated and played it decidedly safe in the telegram he sent to Ulbricht, Grotewohl and the Soviet High Commissioner. Grass, then, has Brecht use the genuine insurrectionists to teach his actor-plebeians how one "stages" a real uprising.

At this point Grass has his whole play, a significant though by no means momentous drama of one of the byplays of the larger tragedy of the failure of the East German revolt. But Günter Grass, who is admirably aware of the German intellectuals' facility for making their peace with dictatorial governments, felt forced to go a considerable step further. He tries to make us believe that Brecht's equivocation and cynical aesthetic exploitation of political reality (staging revolutionary dramas but cherishing the soft life) are directly responsible for the collapse of the uprising. Grass even has a second delegation appear at the Brecht theater, as though desperately wanting to impress Brechts' importance on us. I wish, if only for the sake of Grass' play, that Brecht *had* been in a position to tip the balance.

Dramatically Grass' play is made to depend on whether one is convinced that Brecht's support of the workers would have made the decisive difference. But within the context of brute power as presented in the play—the disorganized workers on the one hand, Ulbricht and the Soviet tanks on the other, with the floundering intellectuals, torn between self-interest and allegiance to their professed belief, somewhere in the middle—Bert Brecht, and anything he might do or say, appears incredibly insignificant. By straining to embrace a wide, historically momentous subject the play turns into a prolonged anti-climax. The only one to whom Brecht's decision makes a difference is Brecht himself, to his conscience. It is not the uprising of the East German workers that collapses on the stage of the Brecht theatre, as Grass had hoped to demonstrate, but

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only Bert Brecht himself.

And what is best about the play is Grass' characterization of Brecht; bossy, mischievously petulant, overly theatrical, cruel, sentimental, yet still with a small share of self-respect, part clown, part tragic figure. Here Grass has created his most complex character. Brecht completely dominates the play, and not because of any attributes of power Grass was able to foist on him, but rather because Brecht's political impotence becomes overpoweringly clear. What has happened to Brecht in Grass' hands is comparable to what happened when Brecht sought to fashion Mother Courage so that the audience would detest her. A visceral dislike of one's protagonist is perhaps one of the assurances an artist can have that that protagonist will come alive.

Ombudsmen and Others

WALTER GELLHORN

Harvard, $6.95

When Americans Complain

WALTER GELLHORN

Harvard, $3.95

RICHARD ROBBINS

Ombudsman. The word has an exotic ring, suggesting the ruling prince of a vaguely Eastern kingdom in a play by Bertolt Brecht. In fact, as every discerning newspaper reader knows by now, it refers to a national Swedish official, appointed by, but independent of, the legislature, who investigates complaints against the governmental bureaucracy brought by ordinary citizens despairing of obtaining redress through ordinary channels. The institution of "people's watchdog" has flourished in Sweden since 1809, but it was not until 1955, when the Danish Ombudsman took up his work, that the idea of an external critic functioning in behalf of an aggrieved individual became the subject of international attention.

This brace of books by a distinguished professor of law at Columbia covers the ground thoroughly at home and abroad. *Ombudsman and Others* is a somewhat technical, comparative treatment of the



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role of ombudsman in Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Yugoslavia, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Japan. *When Americans Complain,* written in livelier vein for lay readers, seeks to answer the question of whether we need national, state, or local ombudsmen given the system we already have: courts, review boards, Congressmen and other elected representatives, and—why not, it's a free country!—the President of the United States. Professor Gellhorn answers "yes"—on which more below.

Professor Gellhorn is affirmative as well on the value of the citizen's defender in the Old World. But in both books, as in his previous work, he is tough-minded and pragmatic about the *limits* of administrative procedural reforms. Being attractive and workable, the ombudsman idea, like so many other imports to this country, runs the risk not of resistance but of over-acceptance, of consideration as a panacea rather than what it is, a procedure.

Only forthright policy decisions can restrain the excessive zeal of our CIA or persuade our HEW to take up effective action against individuals who pollute the atmosphere. To give a concrete example: If the ombudsman in Scandinavia is particularly receptive to, say, prisoners' complaints, he may be led to *suggest,* but not to *demand,* changes in national penal philosophy. In Professor Gellhorn's words, "Ombudsmen, no matter how accomplished they may be, cannot replace all other mechanisms that make for governmental justice and wisdom. They must be viewed as supplementers of, not as substitutes for, legal controls."

It is true that the Procurator Generals in Poland and the Soviet Union can prosecute and otherwise discipline offending administrators; so can the Danish and Norwegian Ombudsmen. However, the essence of the role is surveillance and persuasion rather than enforcement. Administrative authorities know that since the majority of complaints received by ombudsmen are found to be not warranted, the external critic provides them, in effect, with a periodic validation of their fair-mindedness in dealing with the public. But they are equally aware that the endorsement is not a blanket one. The possibility of outside intervention and investigation is always there, providing the bureaucrat an additional reason for keeping the public well served. "This voluntarism might be called a response to anticipatory persuasion, but certainly not to coercion."

While there are marked differences in population and in social and political structure in the countries he surveys, Gellhorn finds that, on balance, the system of independent grievance procedures is worthwhile in all the countries, whether rather clumsily worked out (Japan, Poland) or nicely articulated (New Zealand, Denmark). The evidence bears him out, but I think he has insufficiently emphasized the fact that in countries where authoritarian statist restrictions remain in play to one degree or another (Poland, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union) the presence of an ombudsman offers no promise of a widening of individual political freedom in general. The great run of complaints are non-ideological involving disputes with officials, arguments about rules, permits, papers. Attentive to complaint, the ombudsman can do nothing about dissent. Which makes for rather a Kafkaesque definition of "grievance" until, as in Yugoslavia, political freedom is enlarged as such.

Returning to *When Americans Complain,* why is there presently an intensified demand for ombudsmen here? Professor Gellhorn provides a persuasive argument for his "complementary and supplementary" thesis. Litigation in the courts against offending officials demands too much in time and costs from many citizens, especially the poor. A department's own grievance machinery, no matter how well intended, is likely to provide only *pro forma* service. Congressmen and other legislators, while obviously closely attuned to constituent complaints, are faced with a flood of requests and must necessarily function principally as transmitting agents whose names on routine inquiries add a little weight when received at the appropriate bureaus.

All this leads Professor Gellhorn to recommend more extensive use of the ombudsman idea at all three levels of government. Congressmen in Washington ("the present 535 ombudsmen") could be effectively aided by an Administrative Counsel and his staff; complaints would still be forwarded to Congressmen from constituents but investigated by independent ombudsmen. However, the Gellhorn proposals which seem the most useful apply primarily to state and municipal governments. The scale is more manageable; most of our states have populations smaller than Sweden's. In cities like New York where the present tangle of review boards and special offices of investigation satisfies no one, Professor Gellhorn's question is wholly relevant: What have we to lose?

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We have in fact something to gain at modest cost in introducing general ombudsman offices into some of our metropolitan communities.

These two thoughtfully-written books should provide welcome reinforcement to an emerging ombudsman movement in America. Nevertheless, it is no criticism of the solid scholarship of Walter Gellhorn to insist that *any* new administrative technique can be no more than a minor form of change when the political and social order is as deeply out of joint as it is today. The ombudsman's role is vital. But narrow.

Johann Sebastian Bach

KARL GEIRINGER

Oxford University Press, $7.50

ARCADI NEBOLSINE

It is extraordinary to read in the publisher's blurb to this book that it is "the first important work on the great composer in nearly a generation."

In an age of overwriting and generally deplored waste, one of the greatest artists of all time has been passed by, actually "skied" (that is acknowledged as transcendent and consequently *irrelevant*). A young Soviet poet wrote some lines recently about "God" and "Bach" but on the whole it could be expected that the study of Bach should not be particularly advanced in the U.S.S.R. The Christian and devotional subject matter of his chief work (just as that of the later Dostoeyevsky, as René Wellek pointed out) presents certain problems. Belief is discouraged and so is the "suspension of disbelief."

But for Judaeo-Christian America, with its cult of the "Baroque" Donne or G. M. Hopkins, to more or less ignore the great cantatas is something that needs explanation. The instrumental work of Bach, by its very nature, does not call for much explaining. But the vocal music, with its overwhelmingly symbolic and religious content, does.

And yet for "nearly a generation" except for the perceptive and very exciting remarks of Kerman in his *Opera as Drama,* there has not been much in the way of interpretation. The trouble started with certain theorists of the 1920's who fabricated the myth of Bach's "pure music," "pure form." The method worked very well for an understanding of his clavier exercises—his 48 Preludes and Fugues, but not for the great religious cantatas. In fact it was a device by which the enlightened, aesthetic "emancipés" could overlook the disturbing religious implications, the intense expressiveness (what Bach himself called the "affects") of these pieces. Bach could be rendered "safe" for use in Huxley's *Point Counter-Point* or in jazz projects. For example there was (or is) a nefarious French group that *vocalizes* (that is sings in meaningless syllables) Bach's instrumental suites and partitas. The music is not an expression but an abstraction. It is rendered harmless and has become irrelevant.

In most fields today the "formal" method has been enriched or absorbed by more immediately emotional, human and problematical approaches, whether mythic or existential. However, Bach criticism has lagged behind. It seems easier to identify with the "battle of life" in the Hindu epics, with the moral struggles of Greek tragedy, than with the problems vividly, explicitly and repeatedly presented by Bach's Cantatas.

So at last a serious work is promised with this book of Professor Geiringer. The work is supposed to take advantage of the new discoveries in Bach scholarship, available since 1950. Unfortunately (as can also be seen in the revised *Bach Reader*) nothing very revealing has been discovered. The value of the book is based on the sense, perceptiveness and warmth of Geiringer's observations. I hope that it will attract attention and direct people to the "great questions," the "deep eternal theme" associated with any serious approach to this composer.

In his cantatas, Bach deals with what Kierkegaard would call the "desperate struggle for faith, for possibility," the alternative states of hope and fear, with what he supposed to be vital religious questions. Yet these works are performed as "abstractions" or as musical offerings of frigid piety. In recordings, voices can be amplified or made "exciting" by the "technician" but the general atmosphere of live and *real* performances of Bach seems to be remote, worthy and dull, and performances are limited anyway to the Matthew Passion, the B. Minor Mass and instrumental works. For this reason books like Professor Geiringer's are necessary in order to bring home the intensity, dialectic and affective force of Bach's chief work, to give the great composer a chance to "speak."

CORRESPONDENCE

(Continued from page 251)

Mr. Chase criticizes "organized Medicine, not individual physicians." I believe that the A.M.A. represents the thinking of the majority of its membership. But we must remember that its structure resembles our own United States. Physicians from Texas think as Texans; we in Connecticut may think a little differ-

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ently. Also, each state society has certain powers immune to action by the A.M.A.; this relationship is analogous to our federal government and the states. In fact, for the most part, the state societies function quite independently of the A.M.A.

As to shortage of physicians. I agree that there is both a shortage and maldistribution of physicians. But we must remember that every young American has the right to go into whatever profession he wishes; to take up whatever specialty he wishes, and practice in whatever state or community he wishes. I for one couldn't possibly consider dermatology; nor do general surgery in the rural hills of Tennessee. The Boston *Globe* recently reported that not one of the present medical school seniors of Harvard, Boston University or Tufts University medical schools plans to go into general practice. The A.M.A. is working to encourage physicians to go into family practice.

I happen to agree that the shortage of physicians was not accurately predicted by the A.M.A., but to imply that the A.M.A. discouraged the building of medical schools is not a fact. I'll agree that the A.M.A. advocates decentralization of government, and state and private action over the federal government.

But there is a shortage of personnel in most professions. Science has moved so fast that our habits, thinking, and institutions haven't kept apace. I know of no one who 20 years ago predicted the present intense specialization in medicine.

I must ask for more proof than bald assertion that as a result of Medicare and Medicaid, "Millions are getting care hitherto denied them" or "Only half of all qualified students can be accommodated [in medical schools]." Mr. Chase believes that medical practice should be treated as a public utility because "a layman cannot make a reasonably sound choice of doctors"; who would he have make the choice? Most people in the U. S. wish to choose their own physician, clinic, or hospital; in some other countries they don't have a choice.

He states "doctors are soliciting patients . . . " And, doctors' charges are "excessive." If any reader believes these statements, I suggest he communicate with the local medical society; both practices, if true, are unethical, and, Mr. Chase notwithstanding, corrections will be made. As a physician, I try to be scientific, to insist on fact, to be responsible in my statements. I'm committed to the philosophy of meliorism in the medical care of people as much as Mr. Chase. He has a right to write as he does, but *Commonweal* should demand more responsibility than displayed by Mr. Chase.

J. A. FABRO, M. D.

Reply

New York

To the Editors: 1. Dr Fabro can readily verify the facts about the "millions" who "are getting care hitherto denied them" by requesting the news release, "1966 Year-End Report: Social Security And Medicare," issued by Robert M. Ball, Commissioner of Social Security at his press conference summarizing the status of Medicare, December 29, 1966. I interviewed Commissioner Ball after that press conference. The total cited was 5 million, in fact, 3.5 million under Title 18, 1.5 million under Title 19, and by the time my *Commonweal* article appeared, the total had increased considerably. The President's budget states that 6.5 million persons will receive treatment under Title 19 alone in 1967.

2. "Care hitherto denied them" is, if anything, an understatement: indeed much of the care under Medicare is care denied even those of us in the most comfortable circumstances, let alone the elderly and indigent, because Medicare covers more services than the average private health insurance policy does and furthermore it means care now usually rendered in semi-private rooms by senior physicians, not in wards reserved for the poor for teaching purposes. This is proving to be a revelation to the elderly ill who from pride, poverty or physical incapacity could not or would not see a doctor on a charity basis. Incidentally President Johnson in his recent special message to Congress on the elderly also used the term "millions" in describing those getting first-class medical care for the first time.

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3. As to Dr. Fabro's query about the source for the statement that only half of all qualified students being accommodated by the medical schools, he will find this in an excellent roundup report based upon government figures on page 60 of *U.S. News And World Report,* January 23, 1967, entitled "Why Crisis In Medical Care Keeps Growing."

4. Yes, "doctors are soliciting patients," as Dr. Fabro surely must be aware by now. I suggest he interview the administrators or claims examiners of some of the intermediary insurance companies who are handling Medicare to verify the outrageous manner in which the more unscrupulous physicians are soliciting elderly patients in nursing homes. Or read the article by Senator Clinton Anderson (co-author of the Medicare bill) in the May 1966 issue of *Look,* where Senator Anderson reports on physicians going into nursing homes to spend ten minutes seeing ten welfare patients and billing each for "examinations" and giving expensive unnecessary treatment and unwarranted laboratory tests.

5. Yes, doctors' charges are "excessive" since Medicare, even by the most permissive standards. See the "Report To The President on Medical Care Prices," March 1967, issued by HEW and my article on same in *The New Republic* of April 15. Doctors' fees rose more in 1966, the year of Medicare's advent, than at any time in 40 years—or maybe a century, as Bureau of Labor Statistics have only been recording fees since 1927 and last year's jump was the greatest ever recorded.

6. Yes, the A.M.A. bears direct responsibility for the doctors shortage because, not once, but repeatedly over the years it fought against proposed federal programs for expanded medical school construction of any major scope, arguing "government interference," and approving, at most, only limited one-time grants. And again read my article, Doctor. Don't you comprehend the quotes? Why try to defend the A.M.A. on this most indefensible point?

7. You entirely miss the point about medical care being eligible to be treated as a monopoly activity like a public utility: the point is that prices should be monitored, as utilities' prices are—not that someone tell the individual what doctor to choose.

8. See my chapter entitled "The Politics of Medicine" in the book *The Crisis in American Medicine* (Harper & Row, 1960) to understand the guild structure of organized medicine. Among other things it clarifies why most doctors under the referral system and the necessity of hospital staff privileges in order to practice successfully are not prone to buck county, district, and state society leadership.

EDWARD T. CHASE

Strike in Chicago

Chicago

To the Editor: . . . On Friday, April 21, the lay teachers of three Catholic high schools in the city went on strike over contract disagreements. Msgr. William McManus, archdiocesan superintendent of schools, threw up his hands and said the archdiocese lacked the recourse a city public system has, that is, a tax increase or a bigger share of current revenue, to gain additional funds. According to Msgr. McManus, the Catholic school system depends upon the generosity of many people, including the lay teachers. Granted —but unlike many religious, a lay teacher is forced to worry about such "incidentals" as rent, mortgages, phone bills, feeding a few children, clothes, etc.

At the outset of the strike, the old cry went up, as it did in several places recently around the country, that the student is the one who is being hurt by a teacher strike. One might then ask if a student is not also being hurt by a yearly 50 percent turnover in lay faculty. . . .

While salaries are a major concern in the strike, an equally important and inseparable factor is the desire on the part of the lay teachers at each individual school that the administration recognize a bargaining agent. The alternative in the past seems to have been what one might call "individual intimidation" of teachers at contract time. . . .

The obvious question here is: Where will we get the money? On the local (Chicago) level, instead of building more mediocre institutions, Archbishop Cody might throw some of the Project Renewal millions, if he gets it, into the existing ones and earmark it for lay faculty salary increases. Supposedly this is part of the plan, but it's all very vague, especially on the high school level. On a nationwide basis, how about a strong lobby in Washington? It is most obvious by now that the Catholic Church is not going to get any federal funds, or state funds, for education unless it makes itself heard. . . . The lay teachers have a legitimate legal and moral cause and should be heard and heeded.

MARY ST. JOHN

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

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